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Option contracts in a vertical industry 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
We examine, in a vertical industry, the strategic role of horizontal subcontracting through option contracts 
by a downstream dominant firm competing with a competitive fringe. Downstream production requires an 
input from an upstream component-producing industry composed of imperfectly competitive suppliers. 
We characterize how the dominant firm may outsource downstream production from fringe firms in order 
to gain bargaining clout in the upstream input market. It is shown that option contracts are preferred to 
fixed-quantity forward contracts, because leverage against upstream suppliers is gained at lower contract 
prices. When there is no market uncertainty option contracts do not alter spot prices beyond that caused 
by unavoidable market power, whereas they increase price volatility whenever demand is subject to 
uncertainty. 
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1. Introduction 
An option contract is an arrangement whereby one of the involved parties, in exchange of a 
payment, has the right but not the obligation to buy or sell a specified item at a specified price 
(the strike or exercise price) up to a specified date. A forward contract may be viewed as 
equivalent to an option contract which is always exercised because the strike price is set at a 
sufficiently low level that makes its execution always profitable.  
The potential strategic effects of forward contracts on the performance of spot markets 
have been largely explored by the literature on industrial organization. From the seminal work 
of Allaz and Vila (1993) examining this question in a vertically integrated industry, a number of 
papers have addressed the issue in relation with outsourcing of production among firms 
competing in the same market, which may be referred as horizontal subcontracting (Kamien et 
al., 1989; Spiegel, 1993; Shy and Stenbacka, 2003). In this line, Antelo and Bru (2002) showed 
that subcontracting downstream production through forward contracts has an anticompetitive 
effect on spot prices in a vertical industry, in sharp contrast with Allaz and Vila’s finding 
concerning forwards in a vertically integrated industry.  
Options contracts are a more sophisticated contracting form than forward contracts and 
perhaps more realistic too. A stylized fact in real-world industries is that a number of business 
relationships and contractual arrangements among firms feature characteristics of an option 
contract. To illustrate, quantity-flexibility contracts in the electronics industry (Barnes-Schuster 
et al., 2002), backup agreements in the catalog companies and manufacturers industry (Eppen 
and Iyer, 1997), or allotment contracts and free sale contracts to book hotel accommodation in 
the travel industry (Castellani and Mussoni, 2005) can be understood as option contracts.  
The operations research literature (Zhao et al, ; Hammond, 1992; Burnetas and Ritchken, 
2005; Wang and Liu, 2007)  does not place the rationale of these option contracts on their 
potential strategic role. The light is placed on the need to manage the risk of inventories 
associated with uncertain demand, which leads firms to use contracts that provide flexibility and 
“coordinate” decisions between various links in the retailer-manufacturer supply chain when 
there is aversion to incurring inventory costs. Indeed, a number of supply-chain models identify 
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the optimal actions for firms and, due to the lack of an incentive to implement those actions, 
how firms can adjust their terms of trade via a contract that establishes a transfer payment 
scheme to create that incentive (Cachon, 2001). 
Given that neither the supply-chain management literature nor the research on forward 
markets consider the potential strategic role played by option contract, our primary goal in this 
paper is to fill this gap by extending the analysis on the strategic role of forward markets to 
option contracts.1 In particular, we want to examine the strategic effects of option contracts in a 
framework in which a dominant firm competing with a fringe of price-taking firms have to 
acquire an essential input from imperfectly competitive upstream suppliers to produce a final 
good. Our objective is to investigate how subcontracting production by the dominant firm to the 
competitive fringe through option contracts and forward contracts may facilitate the acquisition 
of inputs at more favorable marginal prices. Put differently, how these contracts regarding 
subcontracting downstream production to the fringe has a potential to gain strategic benefits in 
the upstream market. This is because these contracts strengthen the bargaining position of the 
contractor firm in dealing with the supplier, by creating a more valuable alternative in case of a 
breakdown in negotiations. 
Our research adds to the literature four important findings. First, when subcontracting of 
downstream production takes the form of option contracts, the dominant firm outsources 
production to the fringe.2 Hence, it can strategically use option contracts to subcontract with the 
fringe as a means to increase the clout in negotiating the acquisition of the input with upstream 
suppliers by reinforcing its market power in the downstream market. Second, although both 
option contracts and forward contracts facilitate better deals with input suppliers, option 
contracts are more profitable than forward contracts for the dominant firm. As a consequence, it 
                                                     
1 Contract theory has also analyzed a different role for option contracts; namely, its usefulness to alleviate moral 
hazard problems in trades when contracts are incomplete and specific investments are needed, in which case 
efficiency may be achieved with an option contract (Noldeke and Schmidt, 1995; Segal and Whinston, 2002). But 
both the operations research literature and that on industrial organization show the use of these contracts with no 
specific investment whatsoever. 
2 Antelo and Bru (2002) found a similar result when subcontracts are binding forward contracts for fixed quantities. 
They also analyzed the balance between vertical and horizontal effects when the downstream segment consists of an 
oligarchic dominant group together with a price-taking fringe.  
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will prefer to use option contracts to outsource downstream production, whenever feasible, 
instead of forward contracts. Third, if the market demand of final good is certain, option 
contracts do not lead to price manipulation in the downstream market beyond that caused by 
market power. Thus, unlike forward contracts, option contracts are innocuous for consumers. 
Fourth, when demand is variable and subject to uncertainty, option contracts may increase 
volatility on spot prices and, as a result, the price of final good may increase. 
The dominant firm may gain leverage against upstream suppliers by subcontracting 
downstream production to its rivals either through forward contracts or through option contracts 
(not necessarily exercised). Although both types of contracts do not seem very different, their 
strategic effects in the contractor’s behaviour and the performance in the spot market are quite 
different, at least when the demand of final good is not subject to uncertainty. Regarding 
forward contracts, they are strategically equivalent to a consolidation process of the dominant 
firm that unfolds through purchasing productive capacity and lead it to achieve stronger market 
power downstream. This is because the dominant firm only gains leverage against input 
suppliers if it actually purchases production from fringe firms. The effect of the stronger market 
power by dominant firm is then an increase in the price of final good. 
Contrariwise, when the dominant firm is not restricted to outsource production through 
forward contracts only, but may also resort to option contracts, it stops manipulating the spot 
price and uses option contracts with the sole purpose of increasing its bargaining power in the 
input market. Hence, a dominant firm with idle capacity may even subcontract production to the 
fringe, but this will be made through option contracts that are sometimes not exercised. Option 
contracts, although likewise anti-competitive, do not increase the price of final good (at least in 
the absence of demand uncertainty), because the dominant firm only needs to sign option 
contracts, i.e. to threaten to buy some downstream production from the fringe, to facilitate 
better deals in the input market. Indeed, it turns out that options are preferable to forwards not 
only for the dominant firm, but also for final consumers, although fringe firms would prefer 
forward contracts.  
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That option contracts do not lead to downstream market distortions beyond those caused 
by unavoidable market power whenever there is no uncertainty in demand of final good is due 
to the fact that they are signed featuring a strike price such that in equilibrium the contracts are 
never exercised. Thus, they only lead to a redistribution of rents from the crucial upstream 
supplier to the dominant downstream firm.  
However, under demand uncertainty, the optimal option contracts regarding 
subcontracting production to the fringe feature a such an equilibrium strike price that they are 
exercised when the demand realization is high. Although option contracts could be designed 
featuring a such strike price that they are never executed, usually this is not the optimal option 
contract. Thus, option contracts lead to stronger market power in the downstream side, which in 
turn causes market distortions in the form of a more volatile price for final good and reduced 
expected consumer surplus.  
That forward and option contracts are both anti-competitive in a vertical industry sharply 
contrasts with Allaz and Vila (1993)’s finding concerning forward contracting in a vertically 
integrated industry.3 What we show in this paper is, firstly, that option contracts are more 
profitable than forward contracts and, as a consequence, they will be preferred whenever they 
are feasible. Secondly, option contracts have similar anti-competitive consequences to the ones 
proved for forward contracts in Antelo and Bru (2002). In particular, the conclusion that option 
contracts in a vertically industry do not lead to price distortion may not hold under market 
uncertainty. As a result, option contracts are better than forward contracts for both the dominant 
firm and consumers. To assure fringe’s production, the dominant firm pays less for the 
outsourced production through option contracts than through forward contracts because only the 
latter lead to an increase in equilibrium price. Thus, the dominant firm subcontracts more 
production when option contracts are available, and this allows it to increase its bargaining 
power in the upstream market. In addition, even if the dominant firm does not execute the 
option contracts in equilibrium, this does not worry consumers, because is merely a struggle 
                                                     
3 Note, however, that Allaz and Vila’s results have been qualified by Ferreira (2003). 
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between the dominant firm and upstream supplier. Finally, fringe firms would prefer forward 
contracts to option contracts.  
Summing up, our analysis of option contracts extends that of forwards in the sense that 
the strategic vertical effect implied by both contracts is clearer for options than for forwards. 
The dominant firm manipulates the price of final good when it is restricted to use forward 
contracts, but if option contracts are feasible, the strategic effect stops increasing such a price 
and instead increases bargaining power in the upstream market. Option contracts then do not 
introduce additional distortions to those caused by a market power firm since they are used to 
increase its leverage against suppliers, which do not lead to additional price distortions in the 
price of final good. Hence, if a vertical industry can use option contracts allowing the 
internalization of profits, the vertical structure leads to distortions in the price of final good, 
even when double marginalization is not an issue,4 and such distortions ought to be compared 
with the risk of vertical foreclosure from a vertically integrated structure.5 
The finding whereby manipulation in the price of final good would not be observed when 
the dominant firm uses option contracts may not hold under demand uncertainty. In this case, 
option contracts lead to greater price volatility and, as a result, higher prices for consumers. The 
dominant firm wishes to increase its bargaining power in the upstream market, but it does not 
have an incentive to increase the price of final good, since such an increase is passed on to 
fringe firms as more expensive option contracts. The increase in the downstream market price is 
a by-product of the fact that option contracts are not contingent on the state of demand. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the model. In Section 3 
we examine the use of forward contracts and option contracts in a vertically integrated industry, 
where these contracts cannot be used for vertical strategic purposes. The effects of such 
                                                     
4 The problem with vertical separation is an outcome of limited contractual options between the firms (both in 
vertical and in horizontal contractual relationship). On one hand, we may conjecture that complete contingent 
contracts between downstream firms would lead, in equilibrium, to contracts not exercised in equilibrium; these 
contracts would not be used in order to increase price manipulation, but only to obtain better deals from suppliers. On 
the other hand, if suppliers and retailers could set long-term contracts, then firms would internalize the vertical profits 
and no further distortions would appear; the threat of short-term option contracts would serve only to shift rents from 
suppliers to retailers. 
5 See Rey and Tirole, 2004, for a survey. 
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contracts on the dominant firm’s behaviour, the (rational-expectations equilibrium) price of 
contracts and the market performance in general is investigated. Section 4 examines the 
strategic use of these contracts in a vertical industry showing that a dominant firm may 
subcontract downstream production to the fringe not for horizontal motives but for vertical 
reasons; namely, to gain leverage in the input market. Despite having idle capacity, the 
dominant firm may subcontract production through option contracts that it may not even 
exercise. This section also shows that option contracts are innocuous for final consumers. 
Section 5 is devoted to uncertainty in demand of final good and shows that in this case the use 
of options may increase price volatility in such market. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper. 
 
2. The model 
 
We consider an industry in which a dominant firm and a fringe of small firms all produce a 
homogeneous final good. In Section 3 the industry is viewed as a vertically integrated industry 
with all firms having identical marginal (and average) costs. Thereafter, it adopts a vertical 
shape, being the dominant firm and the fringe the downstream side, both producing a final good 
for which an essential input (intermediate good) is needed. The input is purchased to an 
upstream supplier at marginal and average cost c, c>0.  
In this framework, the dominant firm may subcontract downstream production to the 
fringe firms through option contracts (where options may not be exercised) or through binding 
forward contracts. In order to concentrate on the vertical strategic role of such contracts, we first 
assume, in Sections 3 and 4, that downstream demand is certain and unchanging. Later, in 
Section 5, we consider that demand is subject to uncertainty, in which case all firms are 
assumed to be risk-neutral. 
In what follows, the cost to the dominant firm and the fringe of acquiring the intermediate 
good will be denoted by cD and cF, respectively. The strike price of option contracts and the 
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delivery price of forward contracts is referred as ps,6 whereas the number of contracts signed is 
X, and the number of option contracts exercised is x (for forward contracts, if follows that 
Xx = ). The dominant firm’s production when it executes x option contracts is ),( cxq , and the 
productive capacity of the competitive fringe as a whole is m. Finally, the inverse demand 
function for final good is given by )(QP , satisfying 0)( <′ QP  and 0)(2))(( ≤′++′′ QPxqQP , 
for all ],0[ Qq∈ .  
We assume that FcQP >)( , so the fringe always produce at full capacity m, whereby 
mcxqQ += ),( . The value of an option contract is }0,max{ sc ppp −≡ , where p is the expected 
spot price. Clearly, in a rational expectations equilibrium, a fringe firm expects the spot price to 
be )( eqQPp ≡ , whereas the spot price for a dominant firm is endogenously determined and 
depends on its own level of production ),( cxq .  
Note that an option contract to subcontract the amount of production xi with a fringe firm i 
is equivalent to set a non-linear tariff iiii xwFxT +=)( , where production acquired by the 
dominant firm must satisfy ii Xx ≤ , the fixed fee of the tariff must be isi XpF = , and the linear 
part must be isi xpw = . On the other hand, we will see below that, for sufficiently low levels of 
the strike price, the dominant firm exercises all the option contracts signed, in which case option 
contracts are equivalent to signing X forward contracts with price scf ppp +=  (subscript f 
stands for forward price) and to signing Xi forward contracts with any fringe firm i for a fixed 
payment isci XppF )( += .  
 
3. Subcontracting production through option contracts 
 
What, in a vertically integrated industry, are the incentives of a dominant firm to outsource 
production to the fringe firms either through a futures market or through an options market? Ex-
                                                     
6 Given the assumptions made on demand, in Sections 3 and 4 there is no opportunity for speculation in option or 
forward markets, so contracts are effectively non-transferable agreements between the dominant firm and fringe firms 
and there is no need to consider an option premium or a forward premium independently of the strike price and the 
market price at execution.   
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post, a dominant firm may manipulate the price of final good by signing option contracts, but 
ex-ante it has no incentive to sign them, at least not at a strictly positive price. It will only then 
sign innocuous option contracts with price 0=cp  that are not subsequently executed and hence 
that do not affect its market behaviour and profits. 
Let us first assume that the dominant firm signs, with the fringe, X ∈ [0,m] option 
contracts at strike price ps, and that it exercises x of them later on. In these circumstances, its 
profits amount to 
  
xpmqPqcmqPxcxq sD ])([])([)),,(( −++−+=p                                         (1) 
 
and are composed of two terms: the first added is the profit derived from internal production, 
whereas the second one is the profit due to the execution of a certain volume of option contracts. 
It also can be noted from (1) that the dominant firm finds it profitable to exercise x, 0>x , 
option contracts if, and only if, the resulting market price is above the strike price, 
.)( spmqP >+
7 
 It is illustrative to solve the problem stated in (1) by proceeding in two stages. We first 
determine the optimal level of internal production for the dominant firm, q(x,c), given the 
number of executed option contracts, x, and then we determine the optimal number of option 
contracts executed. For a given level x of executed option contracts, the internal production of 
the dominant firm, ),( cxq , is that which satisfies the first-order condition8 
 
0)),(()),(()),(( =−++++′ cmcxqPxcxqmcxqP .                               (2) 
 
                                                     
7 The difference between the strike price and the spot price of the ontract will determine its value or moneyness. 
8 For use in Section 4, where c is a variable, note that this result implies that dΠD/dc = -q* < 0. 
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Differentiating (2) with respect to x shows that =
∂
∂
x
cxq ),(
)(2))((
)(
QPxqQP
QP
′++′′
′
−  is negative 
by virtue of the assumptions made on demand. It then follows that: a) )),(( mcxqP + increases 
with x, and b) since 0)),(()),,(( =−+=
∂
∂
s
D pmcxqP
x
xcxqp , it holds that  
 
x
cxqmcxqP
x
xcxqD
∂
∂
+′=
∂
∂ ),()),(()),,(( 2
2p                                        (3) 
 
 is positive. Then )),,(( xcxqDp , the profit given in (1), is a convex function of x and, therefore, 
its maximum in [0,X] is attained at x = 0 or x = X. If we define 
 
∫ +≡
X
dxmcxqP
X
cXh
0
)),((1),( ,               (4) 
 
we can obtain the following result by comparing profits in both corner solutions. 
 
 
Lemma 1. If the dominant firm signs X option contracts with the fringe, then all of them are 
exercised (x=X) whenever the strike price satisfies ),( cXhps < , whereas no one is exercised 
(x=0) if the strike price satisfies ),( cXhps ≥ .  
 
Proof. See the Appendix. 
 
Lemma 1 establishes that only option contracts that feature a strike price ),( cXhps <  will be 
executed by the dominant firm. Note that, accordingly, an option contract featuring a strike 
price ),( cXhps <  is strategically equivalent to a forward contract.  
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Since )),((),( mcXqPcXh +< , the price for the option contracts must compensate the 
difference between the expected final price and the strike price, i.e. fringe firms will only sign 
option contracts that feature )),(( mcXqPpp sc +≥+ . At the cheaper option contract that is 
accepted by fringe firms, the dominant firm’s profit is  
 
[ ] ),()),(( )),,(( cXqcmcXqPXpXcXq cD −+=−p                                  (5) 
 
and the following result holds. 
 
Lemma 2. It is never profitable for the dominant firm to sign option contracts that feature a 
strike price satisfying ),( cXhps < , i.e., that will be later on executed.   
 
Proof. See the Appendix.  
 
In a rational expectations equilibrium, the dominant firm has no incentive to manipulate the 
price of final good by subcontracting production through option contracts that are exercised in 
equilibrium. Since fringe firms ask for a total price sc pp +  at least equal to the expected spot 
price )(QP , then if the dominant firm subcontracts production to the fringe, its incentive to 
manipulate spot prices increases, but any additional rent of the industry thanks to any price 
increase is passed from the dominant firm to the fringe in a rational expectations equilibrium. 
Therefore, one cannot expect the dominant firm to sign option contracts in a vertically 
integrated industry.9   
In the next section, we will examine how the strategic behaviour of the dominant firm in 
subcontracting (downstream) production to fringe firms is affected when they all form the 
downstream segment of a vertical industry and deal with imperfectly competitive upstream 
suppliers of an essential input. 
                                                     
9 Allaz and Vila (1993) show that a dominant firm signs contracts (sells forward its production to final consumers 
and/or to firms on the fringe) in order to gain market share at the expense of rivals. 
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4. Horizontal subcontracting in a vertical industry 
 
We now consider a vertical industry with upstream suppliers of an input (intermediate good) 
and downstream manufacturers-retailers of a final good. Upstream, a super-competitive supplier 
(efficient supplier) is capable of producing an essential input that is required by downstream 
firms at marginal cost c , 0≥c , jointly with an alternative but less efficient source of the input 
at marginal cost c , cc > .10 For the sake of simplicity, the input is transformed with no 
additional production costs into the final good on a one-to-one basis by downstream firms. 
Furthermore, we assume that the lowest conceivable spot price, )),0(( mcqP + , is such that 
cmcqP >+ )),0(( , which guarantees positive profits to fringe firms and, therefore, implies that 
all their production capacity m will be always in use.  
The efficient supplier can charge the dominant firm a two-part tariff wqFqT +=)(  for 
the input. To simplify, we assume that the supplier can make a take-it-or-leave-offer, where the 
alternative for the dominant firm is to produce at marginal cost c , i.e. the cost of acquiring the 
input to the alternative source of less efficient suppliers. 
To this quite standard model of vertical relations, we add the possibility that the dominant 
firm subcontracts downstream production to the fringe through publicly observable option 
contracts. The timing of the game is as follows. First, the dominant firm subcontracts production 
to fringe firms through option contracts. Second, the upstream efficient supplier offers an input 
contract to the dominant firm. Third, the dominant firm decides whether to accept this proposal. 
Fourth, the dominant firm decides the number of options it exercises on the production of the 
fringe (if any). Finally, the dominant firm sets its own production level. This timing is at 
reflecting the fact that subcontracting downstream production to the fringe is the longest-term 
action in the process.11 As usual, we look for a subgame perfect equilibrium.  
                                                     
10 Instead of a competitive supply of the input, the analysis would be unchanged if c were a price ceiling fixed by 
price regulation. 
11 The influence of this timing on our results is discussed below. 
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If there has been an agreement with the input supplier in the third stage of the game, the 
dominant firm produces ),( wxq , where x denotes its decision whether to execute its option 
contracts (in the equilibrium), with Xx ≤≤0 . In equilibrium, the dominant firm accepts the 
input contract and has profits 
 
XpFwp csD −−),(p ,                                               (6) 
 
where eqs
eqeqeq
sD xpmwxqPwxqwmwxqPwp ])),(([),(])),(([),( −++−+=p , being 
eqx  its 
decision whether to execute its option contracts in equilibrium. According to Lemma 2, it will 
execute all the contracts if ),( wXhps <  and will execute none of them if ),( wXhps > .  
On the contrary, in case of disagreement with the input supplier, the dominant firm 
produces ),( cxq off , where offx denotes its decision whether to execute its option contracts (off 
the equilibrium). Again according to Lemma 2, it will execute all the contracts if ),( cXhps <  
and will execute none of them if ),( cXhps ≥ . In this case, its profits amount to  
 
Xpcp csD −),(p ,                                         (7) 
 
where offs
offoffoff
sD xpmcxqPcxqcmcxqPcp ])),(([),(])),(([),( −++−+=p . Therefore, the 
dominant firm accept the input contract proposal if  
 
),(),( cpFwp sDsD pp ≥− .                                         (8) 
 
Since the input supplier has all the bargaining power, it can charge the largest fixed fee that 
satisfies (8), ),(),( cpwpF sDsD pp −= , and has profits 
 
 ),()(),(),( wxqcwcpwp eqsDsD −+−pp .                                          (9) 
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It is immediate that the input supplier maximizes profits when setting an input contract with a 
wholesale price cw =  and a fixed-fee payment ),(),( cpcpF sDsD pp −= . Hence, in 
equilibrium the dominant firm will obtain the profit  
 
XpcpXpFcp csDcsD −=−− ),(),( pp .                                        (10) 
 
We can now analyse the subcontracting decision of the dominant firm in the first stage 
of the game. First note that ),(),( cXhcXh < , where ∫ +=
X
dsmcsqP
X
cXh
0
)),((1),(  and 
∫ +=
X
dsmcsqP
X
cXh
0
)),((1),( ;12 and that, by virtue of Lemma 1, the optimal decision of the 
dominant firm is always either to execute all option contracts, x=X, or not to execute any of 
them, x=0. We have then to distinguish three possibilities: 
 
(i) Option contracts feature a strike price ps that satisfies  spcXh <),( . 
(ii) Option contracts feature a strike price ps that satisfies  ),( cXhps < . 
(iii) Option contracts feature a strike price ps satisfying  ),(),( cXhpcXh s << . 
 
(i) If option contracts feature a strike price ps satisfying spcXh <),( , we know from Lemma 1 
that they will not be executed, neither if there is an agreement with the efficient input supplier 
and marginal costs of production are c nor if the dominant firm uses the alternative input source 
and thus its marginal cost of production becomes c , 0== offeq xx . Since fringe firms expect 
                                                     
12 Since 0
0
2)(
1
0
),(
)),((
1),(
>
′++′′
′
=
∂
∂
+′=
∂
∂
∫∫
X
ds
PsqP
P
X
X
ds
c
csq
mcsqP
Xc
cXh
, ),( cXh  is an increasing function 
in c. 
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that option contracts will not be exercised, they will accept to sign them at any slightly non-
negative price ε=cp , and the dominant firm has profits 
 
),0(])),0(([ cqcmcqP −+ .    (11) 
 
(ii) If the strike price is such that ),( cXhps < , we know that both in the equilibrium and off the 
equilibrium all option contracts are executed, Xxx offeq == . Fringe firms will sign the option 
contracts only if they compensated the expected final price,13 )),(( mcXqPpp sc +=+ , and the 
dominant firm has profits   
 
XmcXqPmcXqPcXqcmcXqP )]),(()),(([),(])),(([ +−++−+ .        (12) 
 
(iii) Finally, if the strike price featured by option contracts is such that ),(),( cXhpcXh s <≤ , 
we know, from Lemma 1, that the dominant firm sets option contracts that are exercised only 
off the equilibrium path, 0=eqx  but Xxoff = . Note that, in addition to option contracts not 
being exercised in equilibrium, the strike price is well above the expected spot 
price, )),0((),( mcqPcXhps +>≥ ; hence, fringe firms are willing to sign option contracts with 
exercise price ),( cXhps ≥  at a call price 0 =cp , and the dominant firm has profits   
 
XpmcXqPcXqcmcXqP s ])),(([),(])),(([ −++−+ .   (13) 
 
From the analysis of dominant firm’s profits given in (11)-(13), the following result 
holds. 
 
                                                     
13 When the strike price satisfies ),( cXhsp < , option contracts are equivalent to forward contracts with a futures 
price )),(( mcXqPfp += , both in their impact on final prices and in the rents accrued by the dominant and fringe 
firms. 
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Proposition 1. The dominant firm subcontracts downstream production by signing option 
contracts with all the fringe, X*=m, at a strike price ),( cXhps =  such that, in equilibrium, the 
option contracts are never exercised. 
 
Proof. See the Appendix. 
 
The dominant firm could subcontract downstream production to fringe firms by signing option 
contracts that are exercised in equilibrium (and are thus equivalent to forward contracts); the 
derivative of profits given in (11) with respect to X is  
X
X
mcXqPmcXqPmcXqP
∂
+∂
−+−+
)),(()),(()),(( ,                          (14) 
which is strictly positive when evaluated at X=0, since 0)),0(()),0(( >+−+ mcqPmcqP . 
However, the dominant firm obtain larger profits with option contracts that are not executed in 
equilibrium, because the “call price plus the strike price” of an option contract is below the price 
to be paid with a forward contract.  
That price of forward contracts is larger is due to the dominant firm is committed to buy 
downstream production to the fringe in all circumstances, both in equilibrium (i.e. when an 
agreement with the upstream supplier is reached) and off-the-equilibrium path (i.e. in the case of 
a breakdown in negotiations with the input supplier). As a consequence, forward contracts lead 
to an increase in the price of final good that are reflected in the forward price, 
)),(( mcXqPp f += , which is larger than prices when contracts are not exercised, 
fpmcqP <+ )),0(( . 
It is worth noting that, since in equilibrium the dominant firm does not introduce any 
further price manipulation in the spot market beyond that deriving from exerting its market 
power in the downstream market, the only impact of the option contracts is a redistribution of 
rents from the input supplier to the downstream dominant firm. Subcontracting downstream 
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production through option contracts is then innocuous both for consumers and the fringe when 
there is no market uncertainty. Subcontracting through a forward market is, in contrast, anti-
competitive, since it leads the dominant firm to reduce its production in equilibrium, which 
increases the price of final good. 
This is a quite interesting result to the point that one could say that a social planner 
worried about consumer surplus should promote the use of option contracts. But, does this result 
survive in a market uncertainty context? We will see in the next Section that the absence of anti-
competitive effects of option prices may not persist if the demand of final good is subject to 
uncertainty. 
Note that our result does not depend on the assumption that the upstream supplier offers 
take-it-or-leave-it input contracts to the dominant firm. If for instance it is the dominant firm 
who propose contracts with probability β , )1,0(∈β , its net profits become  
 
),()1(),( cxcx offD
eq
D pββp −+ ,                                               (15) 
 
and it can be shown that the optimal option contract (and the quantity of contracts) remains the 
same; hence, in equilibrium, the dominant firm still does not acquire any downstream 
production from fringe firms. 
We can more generally discuss what happens if the upstream supplier and the downstream 
dominant firm can deal for the input exchange under different scenarios; namely, (a) both before 
and after the futures market opens, (b) only after the futures market opens, (c) only after the 
options market opens, (d) only after the dominant firm acquires productive capacity from the 
fringe. For the dominant firm, scenario (c) is the best one, whereas the remaining scenarios lead 
it to have the same net profits. For consumers, however, scenarios (a) and (c) are equivalent in 
terms of consumer surplus since contracts do not induce further distortions in the price of final 
good other that the unavoidable existence of a dominant firm that exerts market power in the 
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downstream market; moreover, either scenario (a) or scenario (c) are preferred to scenarios (b) 
and (d), where the dominant firm’s strategic actions have anti-competitive consequences. 
 
5. Option contracts when there is demand uncertainty 
 
In Section 4 we obtain the striking result that, in equilibrium, option contracts are not exercised 
and, as a consequence, their signing do not affect final prices. In this section we deal with the 
impact of option contracts when there is demand uncertainty. We see that option contracts are 
sometimes exercised in equilibrium when demand is high, and as a consequence final prices are 
affected by the existence of such contracts.  
Let P(Q,θ) be the inverse demand function of the final good and θ the uncertainty 
parameter for this demand, uniformly distributed in ],[ θθ  with θθ < . We assume that this 
demand satisfies 0),( >θθ QP  and that final prices (taking into account production ),,( θcsq  of 
the dominant firm) increase in θ , 0),,(
d
),),,((d
>
∂
∂
+
∂
∂
∂
∂
=
+
θθ
θ
θ
θθ Pcsq
Q
PmcsqP
.14 We 
moreover restrict ourselves to parameter values for which (i) the price of the final good is 
always above c , and (ii) the dominant firm always produces internally.15 
The full game develops now as follows. First, under demand uncertainty, the dominant 
firm subcontracts downstream production by signing X option contracts with fringe firms, 
mX ≤≤0 . Second, the dominant firm deals with the efficient input supplier. Third, the 
dominant firm decides whether to accept the supplier’s proposal. In case of disagreement, the 
dominant firm is restricted to use the alternative source of inputs. Fourth, demand uncertainty is 
                                                     
14 This is indeed the case, for instance, for a linear demand as QQP −= θθ ),(  and for a constant-
elasticity demand as γθθ −= QQP ),(  with )1,0(∈γ . 
15 For a linear demand, this amounts to assume parameter values that satisfy 





 −−+<
2
,2min cccm θθ . 
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revealed.16 Fifth, the dominant firm decides how many option contracts to exercise. Finally, it 
decides its level of internal production. As usual, we look for a subgame perfect equilibrium.  
We may readily characterize the dominant firm’s behaviour regarding the existence of 
demand uncertainty. Now (4) depends on the particular realization of demand,  
∫ +≡
X
smcsqP
X
cXh
0
d),),,((1),,( θθθ ,                                          (16) 
where ),,( θcsq  is the optimal production of the dominant firm, given the executed option 
contracts s, production cost c and demand ),( θQP . Given production cost c and demand 
),( θQP , Lemma 2 still applies: the dominant firm executes all the X option contracts signed, 
x*=X, whenever the strike price sp  satisfies ),,( θcXhps ≤ ; otherwise, the dominant firm 
exercises no option contract, x*=0.  
It is straightforward to see that17 0),,( >
∂
∂
c
cXh θ  and 0),,( >
∂
∂
θ
θcXh . This means that, 
given option contracts X and cost c, there are three relevant intervals:  
(i) If the strike price sp  satisfies ),,( θcXhps ≤ , then the dominant firm exercises 
all the option contracts in any demand state;  
(ii) if the strike price sp  satisfies ),,(),,( θθ cXhpcXh s << , there is a demand 
state, ),(),,(ˆ θθθθ ∈= cXps , in which the dominant firm exercises all 
contracts whenever demand satisfies ),ˆ( θθθ ∈ , and exercises no contract when 
)ˆ,( θθθ ∈ ;  
                                                     
16 A change in the order of stages 2 and 4, i.e. that demand is known when negotiation of input contracts takes place, 
does not affect the choices of the dominant firm (the number of option contracts signed and exercised and the level of 
production). Of course it would affect the dominant firm’s payment to the input supplier that would depend on the 
realization of demand, but the overall expected payment would remain the same. 
17 That 0),,( >
∂
∂
c
cXh θ
 is a consequence of 0
)(
),,(
'
),),,((
>
−′++′′
′
=
∂
∂
=
∂
+∂
cPsqP
P
c
csq
P
c
mcsqP θθθ
. 
In turn, that 0),,( >
∂
∂
θ
θcXh
 is due to 0),,(
d
),),,((d
>
∂
∂
+
∂
∂
∂
∂
=
+
θθ
θ
θ
θθ Pcsq
Q
PmcsqP
. 
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(iii) if the strike price sp  satisfies ),,( θcXhps > , there is no demand state for 
which the dominant firm exercises the option contracts. 
 
We can easily discard that the optimal strike price lies in (i) or (iii). For 
),,(),,( θθ cXhpcXh s << , if the dominant firm produces at marginal cost cc =  we define 
eqθ  as the minimum value of θ  for which options are exercised. This is either θθ =eq  (and 
contracts are never exercised) or the value of the demand parameter that satisfies 
s
eq pcXh =),,( θ . If marginal costs are cc =  we define similarly offθ  as the minimum value 
of θ  for which options are exercised. We have either  θθ =off  or the value of the demand 
parameter that satisfies ),,( offs cXhp θ= . It is immediate to see that 
eqoff θθ < . For instance, 
with a linear demand as QQP −=θθ ),( , we have 
42
),,( XmccXh +−+≡ θθ  and therefore 
2
2
2
2 XpcmXpcm s
eq
s
off −+−=<−+−= θθ .  
In this interval of values of the strike price sp , Figure 1 shows the distinct possibilities 
that we must consider.  
 
Figure 1. Dominant firm behavior according to the strike price values (linear demand). 
 
 
Case (i): . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Region D Region B Region A 
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Case (ii): . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: We are in Region A when   and ; in Region B when and 
; in Region C when  and , with ; and in Region D 
when and .  
 
First at all, we may have either ),,(),,( θθ cXhcXh <  or ),,(),,( θθ cXhcXh < .18 Then we can 
have two different configurations in the behaviour of the dominant firm: 
(i) In Regions A and B, where the strike price satisfies ),,( θcXhps > , option contracts are 
never exercised in equilibrium (when the dominant firm produces at marginal cost cc = ) . The 
price of the option contracts is therefore 0),( =sc pXp  for these values of the strike price.  
 
(ii) For a strike price in Regions C and D, option contracts are exercised in equilibrium 
whenever the demand state satisfies ],[ θθθ eq∈ . In these regions, the price of the option 
contract must compensate fringe firms for the expected revenues in the market: Expected 
revenues for those fringe firms that sign an option contract are 
 
s
eq
sc pFfmcqPpXp
eq
))(1(d)(),),0,((),( θθθθθ
θ
θ
−+++ ∫ ,                        (17) 
 
                                                     
18 With linear demand, we have ),,(),,( θθ cXhcXh <  if and only if θθ −<− cc . 
 
Region D Region C Region A 
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whereas those for fringe firms that sell directly in the market are 
 
 θθθθθθθθ
θ
θ
θ
θ
d)(),),,((d)(),),0,(( fmcXqPfmcqP
eq
eq
∫∫ +++ .                (18) 
 
Thus the option contract must compensate for the market revenues that are resigned in high 
demand states, 
 
0d)(]),),,(([),( >−+= ∫ θθθθ
θ
θ
fpmcXqPpXp
eq
ssc .  (19) 
 
If the dominant firm were to choose option contracts featuring a strike price in Regions C or D, 
then the result in Proposition 1 would no longer extend to arguably more realistic situations in 
which there is demand uncertainty. Before considering this possibility, we can state the 
following result. 
 
Lemma 3. The optimal contract in Regions A and B has a strike price ),,( θcXhps = . 
 
Proof. See Appendix. 
 
According to this lemma, the optimal option contract along those that are never exercised in 
equilibrium is the one with the lowest strike price. The dominant firm has a positive margin on 
these contracts off the equilibrium path, and therefore it makes sense to increase the number of 
demand states in which the option contracts are exercised. 
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However, we are mostly interested in the possibility that the dominant firm chooses 
strike prices in regions C and D. In both regions, option contracts are exercised more frequently 
off the equilibrium path, eqoff θθ <  and moreover final prices are always higher off the 
equilibrium price, ),),,((),),,(( θθθθ mcxqPmcxqP +<+ . Therefore, there is a potential to 
increase expected profits if strike prices are set below ),,( θcXhps = . However, the dominant 
firm must also consider that fringe firm will ask for a strictly positive option contract according 
to (19) that compensates for losses in market revenues. In other words, the dominant firm must 
trade off savings on payments to fringe firms (an increase of sp  reduces the demand states 
where option contracts are exercised in equilibrium) against lower bargaining power in the input 
market (an increase of sp  reduces the demand states where option contracts are exercised off 
the equilibrium path).  
   In Region C, the dominant firm expected profits are 
 
+−++−+= ∫ θθθθθθθp
θ
θ
d)(}]),),,(([),,(]),),,(({[),( fXpmcXqPcXqcmcXqPpXE
off
ss
C
D  
     XpXpfcqcmcqP sc
off
),(d)(),0,(]),),0,(([ −−++ ∫
θ
θ
θθθθθ ,                              (20)              
 
where offθ  is the demand state satisfying soffoff pmcXqP =+ ),),,(( θθ : in the off-the-
equilibrium path the dominant firm exercises the options only in high demand states, 
],[ θθθ off∈ . In region D, in off-the-equilibrium path the dominant firm always exercises the 
options and its expected profits are 
 
θθθθθθθp
θ
θ
d)(}]),),,(([),,(]),),,(({[),( fXpmcXqPcXqcmcXqPpXE ss
D
D ∫ −++−+=  
XpXp sc ),(− .                                                                                                 (21) 
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In both regions, C and D, the dominant firm exercises the option contract in equilibrium in high 
demand states and therefore must pay the option contract in (19), 
0d)(]),),,(([),( >−+= ∫ θθθθ
θ
θ
fpmcXqPpXp
eq
ssc . The price cp  of the option contracts 
must compensate the fringe firms for the profits they would expect in high demand states. 
In Region C, the expected profits of the dominant firm evolve with the strike price as 
follows 
 
XFF
p
fpmcXqP
p
pXE offeq
s
eq
eq
s
eqeq
s
s
C
D








−−
∂
∂
−+=
∂
∂ )]()([)(]),),,(([),( θθθθθθp      (22) 
 
and in Region D as 
 
XF
p
fpmcXqP
p
pXE eq
s
eq
eq
s
eqeq
s
s
D
D








−
∂
∂
−+=
∂
∂ )()(]),),,(([),( θθθθθp .          (23) 
 
Both derivatives (22) and (23) have an ambiguous sign: In both of them, there is a negative 
term, )]()([ offeq FFX θθ −−  in (22) and )( eqXF θ−  in (23) (when 0)( =offF θ  in Region D), 
that reflects the fact that option contracts are exercised more frequently off the equilibrium path 
than in equilibrium; hence, an increase in the strike price sp  increases the cost of the contract 
off the equilibrium. At the same time, there is the positive term 
s
eq
eq
s
eqeq
p
fpmcXqPX
∂
∂
−+
θθθθ )(]),),,(([  either in (22) or (23), which indicates that an 
increase in sp  diminishes the number of demand states where the option is exercised, thereby 
decreasing the upfront payment cp . 
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5.1. A linear demand example 
 
In what follows, we explicitly calculate the optimal number of option contracts to be signed by 
considering a linear demand schedule QQP −=θθ ),( , with the uncertainty parameter θ  
uniformly distributed in ],[ θθ . The dominant firm’s problem of finding the optimal contract 
},{ cs pp and the optimal number of option contracts are obtained in two steps. First, we 
determine the optimal contract as a function of the level of contracts, and then we find the 
optimal level of contracts. When the optimal contract is chosen, it is done in terms of the strike 
price; the premium cp  — stated in terms of the strike price and the number of contracts — is 
the lowest premium the dominant firm must pay to fringe firms for these to accept the required 
number of contracts (and assuming fringe firms correctly evaluate their expected profits, i.e., 
assuming a rational expectations equilibrium in the contracting stage). 
The dominant firm produces )(
2
1),,( xcmcxq −−−= θθ  and the price of the final good 
is )(
2
1),),,(( xcmmcxqP ++−=+ θθθ . The above-mentioned Regions A, B, C and D are now 
easily defined from XcmcXh
4
1)(
2
1),,( ++−= θθ . Hence, we are in Region C when the 
strike price sp  satisfies XcmpXcm s 4
1)(
2
1
4
1)(
2
1
++−<<++− θθ  and in Region D when 
Xcmps 4
1)(
2
1
++−≤ θ .  
Derivatives (22) and (23) become 
 
θθ
p
−




 −−=
∂
∂ XccX
p
pXE
s
s
C
D )(
2
),(                                      (24) 
 
and  
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θθ
θθp
−




 −−=
∂
∂ XX
p
pXE eq
s
s
D
D )(
2
),(                                 (25) 
 
respectively, where 
2
2 Xpcm s
eq −+−=θ .  
 
Lemma 4. The optimal strike price is )(
2
1* Xcmps ++−= θ  in Region D 
when )}(2),(2min{ θθ −−< ccX , and 
42
),,(* XcmcXhps +
+−
==
θθ  otherwise. 
 
Proof. See Appendix. 
 
According to Lemma 4, we can be sure that for some parameter values, the dominant firm will 
choose a number of option contracts X such that they will be exercised in equilibrium when 
demand is high. In addition, we can evaluate in the case where )}(2),(2min{ θθ −−< ccX  the 
amount of option contracts that maximizes the expected profits of the dominant firm. 
 
Proposition 2. When )}(2),(2min{ θθ −−< ccX , the dominant firm chooses to sign  X *= m 
option contracts with the fringe, the optimal strike price is ( )cps += θ2
1*   and option contracts 
are executed when ],[ 2 θθθ
m+∈  . 
 
Proof. See Appendix. 
 
According to Lemma 4 and Proposition 2, for parameter constellations such that 
)}(2),(2min{ θθ −−< ccX  the dominant firm subcontracts with all the fringe firms and 
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exercises contracts in high demand states. For other values of the parameters, the dominant firm 
subcontracts with all the fringe firms, but never exercises the contracts in equilibrium.  
 
The main consequence of Lemma 4 and Proposition 2 is that the signing of option contracts 
harms consumers in high demand states.  
 
Corollary 1. When )}(2),(2min{ θθ −−< ccX , consumers are worse off with option contracts 
if [ ]θθθ ,2m+∈  , since final prices jump from )(2
1 mc −+θ  to )(
2
1 c+θ  in this interval of the 
demand parameter. 
 
It is instructive to compare market performance under forward and option contracts. If forward 
contracts are used, the dominant firm profitably acquires production from fringe firms.19 For a 
number of forward contracts Xf, the forward price is ),),,(( θθ mcXqEPp ff += , where EP 
denotes expected price, and expected profits are 
 
 
θθθθθθθp
θ
θ
d)(}]),),,(([),,(]),),,(({[)( fXpmcXqPcXqcmcXqPXE ffffff
f ∫ −++−+=
 (26) 
 
With a linear demand and uniform distribution on the parameter value, expected profits stated in 
(26) become 
  
( ) ( )∫ −



 −+−−−=
θ
θ θθ
θ
θp
dXccXcmXE fff
f
2
1
4
1
4
1)( 22                     (27) 
                                                     
19 A forward contract that pays pf for one unit of product is equivalent to an option contract with a strike 
price ps below ( )θ,, cXh  (and therefore is always exercised) acquired at price pc = pf – ps. 
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and  
 
( ) f
f
Xcc
X
XE
2
1
2
1)(
−−=
∂
∂ p .                                           (28) 
 
Therefore, we obtain that the dominant firm signs { }mccX f ,min* −=  forward contracts. 
Figures 2 and 3 show some examples of the above analysis. For both figures we consider 
the linear demand case and the parameter values )0,20,100,140(),,,( =ccθθ .20 For fringe 
sizes as 20=−< ccm , the equilibrium number of option and forward contracts is the same, 
mXX f ==
** . Forward contracts always have an anticompetitive effect, by increasing final 
prices from )(
2
1 mc −+θ  to )(
2
1 c+θ . In turn, option contracts are innocuous when demand is 
low, [ ]2, m+∈ θθθ , but have the same anticompetitive effect than forward contracts when 
demand is high, [ ]θθθ ,2m+∈ .  
An example where final prices are more volatile with option contracts than with forwards 
and are above prices with forward contracts in high demand states is depicted in Figure 2 for the 
particular case when m=10. For this fringe’s size, 10** === mXX f  for both option and 
forward contracts. In equilibrium, final prices are θθ
2
1),( * =fXP   with forward contracts and 






>
<−
=
105 if ,
2
1
105 if ),10(
2
1
),( *
θθ
θθ
θXP  with option contracts.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
20 In order to have always strictly positive production and final prices above 20=c , we must have m<40. 
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Figure 2. Final prices with forward and option contracts when the fringe’s size is low (m=10). 
 
 
 
 
Interestingly, the welfare ranking between option and forward contracts is ambiguous 
when 40)(220 =−<<=− ccmcc . In equilibrium, the dominant firm does not sign forward 
contracts with all the fringe, 20* =−= ccX f . Under forward contract final prices always jump 
from ( )mc −+θ
2
1  to ( )cc −+ 2
2
1
θ , whereas under option contracts consumers pay the same 
prices ( )mc −+θ
2
1  when demand is low (and are therefore better off than under forward 
contracts) but pay higher prices ( )c+θ
2
1  when demand is high.  
Figure 3 depicts the case when m=30 showing as final prices under option contracts 
exhibit more volatility than under forward contracts, and are lower than with forward contracts 
in high demand states.  
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Figure 3. Final prices with forward and option contracts when the fringe is medium-sized (m=30). 
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In fact, for this size of fringe, 20* =fX  with forward contracts, whereas 6.26
* =X  with 
option contracts, so mXX f <<
** . In equilibrium, final prices are )10(
2
1),( * −= θθfXP  with 
forward contracts and 







+>+−
+<−
=
2
100 if  )30(
2
1
 
2
100 if  )30(
2
1
),(
*
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XX
X
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θθ
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θ  with option contracts. 
 
6. Concluding remarks 
 
In this paper we have investigated the strategic role played by option contracts and forward 
contracts regarding outsourcing of production in a vertical industry, where the downstream 
industry consists of a dominant firm together with a competitive fringe of small firms. 
Downstream production requires an input from a component-producing industry with a super-
competitive supplier as well as second supply source. In this context, it is shown that, without 
uncertainty in the demand of the final good, the dominant firm subcontracts downstream 
production to the fringe firms through forward contracts in order to increase final prices to 
m 
θθ −  
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consumers (strategic horizontal effect). However, when it can use option contracts regarding 
subcontracting to the fringe firms these contracts are strategically used to increase the firm’s 
leverage in the input market (strategic vertical effect) as preferable to increasing the price of the 
final good. Thus, the dominant firm stops manipulating prices in the downstream market when 
it can sign option contracts and increases its bargaining power in the upstream market. In a 
sense, option contracts allow us to observe, in greater detail, a strategic effect that is absent 
under forward contracts. 
When there is uncertainty in the market demand of the final good, option contracts 
regarding subcontracting production may have the unintended consequence of increasing price 
manipulation in the downstream market. However, this effect could be avoided if buyers and 
sellers were able to sign long-term contracts or even if they integrated vertically. Hence, our 
findings extend the well-known result that vertical integration may serve to increase both the 
firms’ profits and the consumer surplus, through the disappearance of double marginalization, 
which is replaced by a more general contracting set-up. This should be contrasted with the 
possibility that vertical integration leads to vertical foreclosure. Future research should try to 
disentangle the circumstances in which each of these countervailing effects is likely to 
dominate.  
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Appendix 
 
Proof of Lemma 1. If x option contracts, ],0[ Xx∈ , are exercised in equilibrium, and 
production is chosen optimally at ),( cxq , the dominant firm’s profit amounts to  
 
[ ] [ ]xpmcxqPcxqcmcxqPxcxq sD −+−−+= )),((),()),(()),,((p .               (A1) 
 
Profits given in (A1) are a convex function of x, since  sD pmcxqPx
xcxq
−+=
∂
∂ )),(()),,((p  and  
 
0
)),((2))(),((
)]),(([),()),(()),,((
2
2
2
>
+′+++′′
+′
−=
∂
∂
+′=
∂
∂
mcxqPxqmcxqP
mcxqP
x
cxqmcxqP
x
xcxqDp . 
  (A2) 
  
Therefore the optimal number of option contract executed is either x=0 or x=X. If we write the 
difference )0),,0(()),,(( cqXcXq DD pp −  as 
 
 ( ) ( )XpcXhdxpmcxqP s
X
s −=−+∫ ),( )),((
0
,                         (A3) 
 
it can be shown that )0),,0(()),,(( cqXcXq DD pp >  whenever ),( cXhps < .                       
 
Proof of Lemma 2. The derivative of the profit stated in (5) with respect to X is  
 
[ ]
X
cXqcmcXqPcXqmcXqP
∂
∂
−+++′
),()),((),()),(( ,                           (A4) 
which, according to (2), can be written as  
X
cXqXmcXqP
∂
∂
+′−
),()),(( ,                                          (A5) 
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and since the derivative 
X
cXq
∂
∂ ),(  is strictly negative, it immediately follows that 0* =X .       
 
Proof of Proposition 1. Since the dominant firm’s profit given in (13) is a decreasing function 
in sp , the optimal strike price in the interval ),(),( cXhpcXh s <≤  is ),( cXhps = . In the 
interval ),( cXhps < , an option contract has total cost )),(( mcXqPpp sc +=+ . Since the 
strike price ),( cXhps =  is strictly lower than )),(( mcXqP + , profits given in (12) and 
evaluated at ),( cXhps =  are strictly higher than profits given in (11). The dominant firm has 
then profits 
 
 XcXhmcXqPcXqcmcXqP )],()),(([),(])),(([ −++−+ .  (A6)  
 
The derivative of these profits with respect of X, { }
X
XcXhmcXqP
∂
−+∂ )],()),(([ , is 
 
)),(()),((),(),()),(( mcXqPmcXqPX
X
cXhcXhmcXqP +−+=
∂
∂
−−+ ,          (A7) 
 
which is strictly positive. Thus, profits with 0>X  are larger than profits given in (11) when no 
option contracts are signed. The optimal number of option contracts is then X*=m.  
 
Proof of Lemma 3. In Region A, the option contract is exercised off the equilibrium path (if 
there is no agreement between the dominant firm and the input supplier and marginal costs of 
production are cc = ) only if the demand state satisfies ],[ θθθ off∈ , with θθ >off , whereas in 
Region B the option contract is always exercised off the equilibrium path. In region A, the 
dominant firm’s expected profits are  
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θ
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∫ −++ ,                                         (A8) 
whereas in region B, spcXh <),,( θ , and the dominant firm’s expected profits amount to  
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From (A8) and (A9) it can be checked that 0)](1[),( <−−=
∂
∂ XF
p
pXE off
s
s
A
D θp  and 
0),( <−=
∂
∂ X
p
pXE
s
s
B
Dp , respectively. Thus, in these regions expected profits are a decreasing 
function of the strike price, which imply that the optimal contract features a strike price 
),,( θcXhps = .  
 
Proof of Lemma 4. When parameter values satisfy cc −<−θθ , we have an interior solution 
in region D; namely, 0),( =
∂
∂
s
s
D
D
p
pXEp  at 
42
),,(* XcmcXhps +
+−
=<
θ
θ  only when 
)(2 θθ −<X .  Thus when )(2 θθ −<X  the optimal strike price is ( )Xcmps ++−= θ2
1*  and 
when )(2 θθ −>X  the optimal strike price is 
42
),,(* XcmcXhps +
+−
==
θ
θ . 
When parameter values satisfy θθ −<− cc , we have a corner solution in region C: 
0),( <
∂
∂
s
s
C
D
p
pXEp  if )(2 θθ −<X  and 0),( >
∂
∂
s
s
C
D
p
pXEp  otherwise; and an interior solution in 
region D; namely, 0),( =
∂
∂
s
s
D
D
p
pXEp  at 
42
),,(* XcmcXhps +
+−
=<
θθ  only when 
37 
 
)(2 ccX −< . Therefore when )(2 ccX −<  the optimal strike price is ( )Xcmps ++−= θ2
1*  
and when )(2 ccX −>  the optimal strike price is 
42
),,(* XcmcXhps +
+−
==
θ
θ .  
 
Proof of Proposition 2. The derivative 
X
pXE s
D
D
∂
∂ ),( *p   is 
 
X
X
pXppXpfpmcXqP
X
pXE sc
scs
s
D
D
∂
∂
−−−+=
∂
∂
∫
),(),(d)(]),),,(([),(
*
**
*
θθθθp
θ
θ
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and taking into account that 
2
1
−=
∂
∂
X
eqθ , and 2
Xeq +=θθ  at ( )Xcmps ++−= θ2
1* , we can 
write (A10) as 
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          (A11) 
 
which is strictly positive. Therefore, mX =* . Equilibrium values of *sp  and 
eqθ  come 
immediately.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
